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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper considers a monopolist that conducts vertical product differentiation. Previous 
analyses that assume customers have unit demand or firms conduct non-linear pricing. In 
contrast to these studies customers purchase multiple units at a linear price. Customers 
differ in their income and preferences, particularly their willingness to substitute between 
quantity and quality.  The model distinguishes those aspects of customer demand that are 
sources of vertical differentiation (income and preferences) from those aspects that cause 
quality distortion. It is demonstrated that under uniform ordering vertical differentiation 
only causes quality distortion when consumer demand is such that there is a material 
difference in the mark-up of different varieties. Under non-uniform ordering a variety of 
patterns of quality distortion are possible.  
  
                                                 
∗ I would like to thank Ann Marsden for useful comments on an earlier draft. All errors remain my 
responsibility.  
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Vertical Product Differentiation with Linear Pricing 
 
Vertical product differentiation is profitable for firms when its customers agree on 
desirability of a products characteristics, or quality, but differ in their valuation of these 
characteristics. If customer groups (or types) are readily identified the monopolist can 
utilise third degree price discrimination. However if customer types cannot be readily 
identified, monopolists can use product differentiation as a ‘self selection’ mechanism to 
identify customers’ groups. The received wisdom on the impact of vertical (quality) 
differentiation follows the pioneering analysis of Mussa and Rosen (1978) (MR). MR 
consider customer that have a unit demand for a good. Increases in quality linearly 
increase the willingness to pay for that unit. Customer differ in the extent to which 
increases in quality increases the willingness to pay. In that analysis vertical 
differentiation leads to inefficiently low quality in all but the highest quality variety.  The 
spectrum of quality levels is predicted to widen as a result. 
The unit demand model introduced by MR allows for a straightforward analysis 
of vertically differentiated markets. Thus it has become imbedded in the subsequent 
literature.1 The unit demand model might be defended as a useful approximation to more 
general cases. However it is not immediately obvious whether the unit demand model is 
approximating linear or non-linear pricing. Maskin and Riley (1984) show that there is a 
direct correspondence between non-linear pricing of quantity and vertical differentiation 
in the unit demand model. In addition, the requirement in the unit demand model that 
consumer utility is cardinal suggests that MR’s analysis is closer to an analysis of non-
linear pricing than linear pricing. Subsequent literature modelling vertical differentiation 
focuses on non-linear pricing (Armstrong, 1996, Armstrong and Rochet, 1999, Rochet 
and Choné, 1998, Rochet and Stole, 2002, Sibley and Srinagesh, 1997, Stole, 1995). 
                                                 
1  For example the recent textbooks by Carlton and Perloff (2005), Church and Ware (2000) and Pepall, 
Richards and Norman (2005) each describe the MR analysis as the outcome of vertical product 
differentiation.  
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In practice, firms use linear pricing is often used to sell vertically differentiated goods.  
For example restaurants often vertically differentiate their meals and drinks, though few 
provide a discount for multiple purchases. A great many grocery items also are priced in 
this way. For instance bakers often sell multiple varieties (of differing quality levels) of 
bread loaf. Supermarkets are selling vertically differentiated goods under their own 
(private) labels (Dobson and Chakraborty, 2008). Coffee shops sell cups of ‘fair trade’ 
and ‘standard’ coffee. Indeed many of the items discussed in the classic literature of 
goods quality – light globes and razor blades – are also sold using liner pricing. (Even 
when these goods are bundled, the extent to which non-linear pricing used is quite 
limited. For example a customer might be forced to choose between 1 or 6 light globes.) 
Recalling Dupuit’s classic example (see Ekelund, 1970), railways set a linear price for 
first and economy class tickets. Similarly airlines set linear prices for first, business and 
economy class tickets.  
Do low quality varieties have sub-optimal quality under linear pricing (as might 
be thought by extrapolating the results of MR) or, rather, are they fit for purpose? To 
answer this question, this paper introduces a model consumers purchase multiple units at 
a linear price. The two commonly cited reasons why customers differ in their demand for 
quality are explicitly modelled: differences in preferences and income. Customers are 
divided into ‘types’ that depends on their preference for quality and income. Specifically 
customers within a type have a common substitutability of quantity for quality and a 
common hourly wage rate. (Customer types with a high substitutability of quantity for 
quality are those whose demand is most influenced by quality changes.) Each customer 
has an elasticity of demand (elasticity of quantity with respect to price) which need not be 
related their substitutability of quantity for quality. There need not be a common 
elasticity of demand within a type; the model allows for the possibility that demand 
elasticities may vary across customer within a type. The customer type’s elasticity of 
demand is the weighted sum of the individual customers’ elasticities of demand within 
the type. 
Under uniform ordering high income types are also the types with a higher 
preference for quality. Vertical differentiation results in the high (low) quality varieties 
being purchased by customer types with relatively high (low) substitutability of quantity 
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for quality and/or high (low) hourly wage. When the firm can costlessly identify 
customer types (third degree price discrimination) then, under the assumptions of the 
model, it provides the efficient quality (though not quantity) for each variety. When, 
however, the firm cannot identify a given customer’s type, it may distort the quality of a 
variety to satisfy self-selection. The model is used to find general conditions under which 
vertical differentiation causes quality distortion under linear pricing and, just as 
importantly, when it doesn’t cause quality distortion.  It is shown that under uniform 
ordering this mechanism only causes quality distortion if there is sufficient difference in 
the mark-up on different varieties. (The precise definition of differences in the mark-up 
of varieties is given in this paper.) In particular a variety has distorted quality if its 
customers have a relatively low mark-up. This only occurs if that variety’s customers 
have relatively high elasticity of demand or relatively low wage. If the mark-up on all 
varieties does not differ greatly, then no variety exhibits quality distortion. 
Non-uniform ordering occurs when high-income types are the types with a 
relatively low preference for quality. It does not appear to be possible to make many 
general claims about quality distortion under non-uniform ordering. However it is 
demonstrated that a variety with a high equilibrium quality level may be one with a low 
efficient quality level under non-uniform ordering. In addition, when there are two 
customer types both may purchase a single variety. This type of ‘bunching’ only occurs 
under uniform ordering when (i) there are three or more customer types and (ii) one of 
the ‘middle’ demand types are readily unprofitable (usually because there are a low 
number of such customer types).  Neither of these requirements is necessary for bunching 
to occur under non-uniform ordering.  
Section 1 of the paper models consumers’ substitutability of quantity for quality 
and elasticity of demand. Section 2 analyses a firm that can conduct third degree price 
discrimination. This analysis is used as a benchmark for the analysis of a firm that 
undertakes vertical differentiation. This latter analysis is undertaken in section 3. The 
cases in which there are two and three types of customers are studied in detail.  Section 4 
concludes the paper. 
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1. Customers 
 
1.1 The Substitutability of Quantity for Quality 
The product under consideration can be vertically differentiated along a 
continuum y. The measure y is called quality of a unit of the good. Different varieties or 
models of the product can be produced which differ purely in their quality levels. The 
quality of each variety is assumed to be common knowledge and is exogenous from the 
point of view of each consumer. 
Assume consumers are divided into 2 types, and let type i have mi individuals. 
Customers within a type have a common substitutability of quantity (units) for quality. 
To capture differences in the substitutability of quantity for quality across customer 
types, let customer j, who is a member of type i (customer ij), measure their satisfaction 
of consuming variety k, xijk, using the relationship xijk=Xijkgi(y), where: (i) Xijk is the 
number of units of variety k consumed and (ii) gi(y) measures the satisfaction per unit of 
type i. The elasticity of this customer’s “iso-satisfaction curve”, dxijk=0, is: 
 
y
Xijk
dXijk
dy  = -ε i gy(y)     (1) 
 
where ε i gy≡ ygi′(y)/gi(y), i=1,2,..,n, be  the elasticity of i’s satisfaction per unit with 
respect to quality. By (1) ε i gy(y) also measures the substitutability of quantity and quality. 
Note this substitutability depends only on customer type. Assume that type 1 consumers 
are more sensitive to quality than type 2 consumers, i.e. ε1 gy(y)>ε2 gy(y) for all y. Assuming 
gi″(y)<0 ensures that customer’s indifference curves are convex.   
 
1.2 Consumer Demand and its Elasticity 
In this section consumer utility is specified, and used to identify the monopolist’s 
demand from each customer type. First it is shown that customer ij purchases variety i.  
Then, by determining customer ij’s demand for variety i, the total demand for each 
variety is specified.  
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Suppose that there are 2 varieties. This ensures that there are sufficient varieties to 
target one variety at each customer type. Let variety k have quality of yk. Customers take 
the satisfaction provided by each variety as perfect substitutes for one another. The utility 
function of customer ij is Uij(gi(y1)Xij1+gi(y2)Xij2,Lij), where Lij is the ‘other activity’, 
which is will be called ‘leisure’, undertaken by the customer. The model allows for 
preference differences within a customer type in order to allow customers to differ in 
their elasticity of demand. Consumption of the each unit takes (non-leisure) time of a 
hours. Each consumer has T hours available. Consumer ij’s budget constraint is thus: 
 
∑
k=1
2
PkXijk = wi(T-Lij-a ∑
k=1
2
Xijk) + Ii    (2) 
 
where Pk is the price per unit of variety k, wi is the hourly wage rate and Ii is the non-
labour income of type i customers. Under ‘uniform ordering’ w1>w2 and under ‘non-
uniform’ ordering w2>w1. 
The customer ij’s maximisation function is: 
 
Max Uij( ∑
k=1
2
gi(yk)Xijk,Lij)  subject to: ∑
k=1
2
⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞Pk+awi
gi(yk) g
i(yk)Xijk + wiLij = wiT + Ii (3) 
 
The price of satisfaction of variety k to customer ij is defined as (Pk+awi)/gi(yk). As 
customers treat the satisfaction provided by each variety as perfect substitutes, the 
customer chooses the variety with the lowest price of satisfaction. Assume that (as will be 
justified below) it is variety i is that type i customers find has the lowest unit price of 
satisfaction. Thus type i will purchase variety i exclusively. Then the consumer ij’s 
optimisation problem becomes: 
 
Max Uij(xij,Lij) subject to  pixij/wi + Lij = T+Ii/wi  (4) 
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where xij≡gi(yi)Xiji is the satisfaction provided to the customer by variety i, and 
pi≡(Pi+awi)/gi(yi) is the price of satisfaction of variety i.  
It is natural to consider the consumer problem in the formulation (4) rather than 
(3). In the formulation (4), satisfaction is the “good” which the consumer must forgo to 
consume leisure. All type i customers face the common prices and income pi, wi, and Ii. 
Thus standard consumer theory can be used to determine the demand for satisfaction and 
demand for units from type i customers as: 
 
xi(pi/wi,Ii/wi) = ∑
j=1
mi
xij (pi/wi,Ii/wi)   
⇔ Xi(Pi,gi(yi),wi,Ii/wi) =∑
j=1
mi
1
gi(yi) x
ij 
⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞Pi+awi
wigi(yi) ,I
i/wi       (5) 
 
where reference to T is suppressed as it is common to all customer types. Type i’s 
elasticity of demand is given by: 
 
ε ix(pi/wi,Ii/wi) ≡ - (pi/xi)(∂xi ∂pi) = - (pi/(wixi)).xi1(pi/wi,Ii/wi)  = ((Pi+awi)/Pi)Εi X  (6) 
 
where Εi X ≡ -(Pi/Xi)(∂Xi/∂Pi). Each consumer, j, of type i has an elasticity of demand that 
is defined analogously to (6), and these elasticities may differ across consumers of type i.  
The elasticity, ε ix, is the weighted sum of the individual type i consumers’ elasticities of 
demand. The elasticity of demand is usually measured empirically by Εi X, however it is ε ix 
that accurately represents the preferences of consumers. Thus it is ε ix that is used in the 
analysis below to represent the elasticity of demand of each consumer type. 
 7 
2. Third Degree Price Discrimination 
This section considers a firm that can costlessly identify customer type. By 
offering members of a particular customer type only one variety the firm can undertake 
third degree price discrimination. This analysis proves necessary to develop and interpret 
the model presented in the next section, in which customers self select the variety they 
purchase. The firm may choose to produce different quality levels to sell to each type of 
customer.  A common technology, summarised by the cost function C(Xi,yi), is used to 
produce each variety. The firm’s cost of producing a variety increases with the number of 
units produced and the quality. More specifically, the cost function is assumed to take the 
often-adopted ‘constant returns to scale’ form: 
 
C(Xi,yi) = Xiψ(yi)      (7) 
 
where ψ′(y) >0 and ψ″(y) >0. Note that, for simplicity it is assumed there are no fixed 
cost, and no economies of scope across varieties. Further this enables the analysis in the 
next section to focus on the role of customer self selection on the distortion of quality. 
A distinct price per unit, Pi, is charged to members of customer type i. The profit 
of the firm, π, is: 
π = ∑
i=1
2
[PiXi – Xiψ(yi)] = ∑
i=1
2
[pixi – fi(xi,yi)]   (8) 
 
where, using (5), fi(xi,yi) ≡ awixi/gi(y) +  xiψ(y)/gi(y) and where xi is defined by (5). It is 
useful to interpret fi(xi,yi) as the total cost (i.e. cost to customer and producer) of 
providing satisfaction of xi  to type i customers as a function of quality.  The minimum 
cost of providing xi to type i customers, yie(xi), is determined by: 
 
yie(xi) = argmin
yi
  fi(xi,yi)     (9) 
 
The following proposition follows directly from the first order conditions of (8).  
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Proposition 1: Under third degree price discrimination the profit maximising 
quality minimises the cost of providing the profit maximising satisfaction to each 
type. Specifically quality is given by (9). The level of satisfaction of each 
customer type is given by: 
pit  = 
(awi+ψ(yie))/gi(yie)
1-(1/ε ix)  ⇔ P
i
t = 
awi
ε ix-1 + 
ψ(yie)
1-(1/ε ix)  (10) 
where pit is the monopolist’s price of satisfaction, and P
i
t is the monopolist’s price 
per unit, under third degree price discrimination. 
To identify the relationship between cost minimising quality and customer type, consider 
the first order condition of (9): 
 
fi2(x,y) = -Xi(gi′(y)/gi(y)2)(awi + ψ(y)) + Xiψ′(yi)/gi(y) = 0  (11)  
or equivalently: 
εψy(yie)[ψ(yie)/(awi + ψ(yie))] = ε i gy(yie)    (12) 
 
where εψy(y) ≡ yψ′(y)/ψ(y). Note that (12) is a function of yie alone, and thus cost 
minimising quality is independent of the number of units produced. This is a requirement 
of Swan invariance. Equation (12) shows that cost minimising quality of a customer type 
is determined by their substitution of quantity for quality and their hourly wage rate.  The 
following result follows from (12) and the adoption of the uniform ordering condition: 
Lemma 1:  y1e>y2e under uniform ordering.   
The proof of this result, and subsequent results, is given in a mathematical appendix. 
Under third degree price discrimination, the firm therefore sets higher quality for 
customer types with higher sensitivity to quality changes, or those with higher hourly 
wages.  
 Note the critical role played by a, the unit consumption time. A relatively high 
value of the unit consumption time means that the price per unit, Pi, is a relatively small 
part of the price of satisfaction. Thus the firm perceives that if faces a relatively inelastic 
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demand curve.2 Thus a high value of the unit consumption time is associated with a high 
price, as indicated by (10). Similarly, a higher unit consumption time means that 
consumers benefit more from quality and, as indicated by (12), will thus demand higher 
quality. The unit consumption time acts as a disincentive to the substitution of quantity 
and quality. A high opportunity cost of time (wage) tends to be translated into a higher 
demand for quality rather than quantity. Again this is indicated by (12).   
Note from equation (12) that if a=0 hourly wage differences do yield differences 
in the cost minimising quality. Thus wage differences do not yield vertical differentiation. 
Similarly, from (12), the cost minimising quality of a customer type is independent of 
their non-labour income. Thus differences in non-labour income across types do not play 
a critical role in vertical product differentiation. Thus, for brevity, it is assumed below 
that Ii=0 for all i. 
An increase in the hourly wage of type i customers has a different effect on the 
price per unit, Pit , than an increase in the substitutability of quantity for quality of type i 
customers. By (12) an increase in the substitutability of quantity for quality (i.e. ε i gy(yie) ) 
increases quality, yie. Thus marginal cost, ψ(yie), is increased and by (10) so is Pit. An 
increase in wi also increases yie and thus marginal cost. However the increase in wage has 
an additional effect. The increase in wi means that the price per unit is a relatively smaller 
part of the price of satisfaction. Thus the firm perceives a reduction in the elasticity of its 
demand curve. It thus increases price. This effect is represented by the first term on the 
RHS of (10). 
In the next section it is necessary to understand the differing affects of an increase 
in the hourly wage and the substitutability of quantity for quality on pit. To assess these 
impacts first observe that from (10):  
 
(pit/wi)(1-(1/ε ix(pit/wi))  = (awi+ψ(yie))/(wigi(yie))    (13) 
 
                                                 
2 The firm will perceive the elasticity of the demand curve it faces as [Pi/(Pi+awi)]ε ix. The greater is the term 
awi the more inelastic is the demand curve. 
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Consider an increase in the substitutability of quantity for quality, ε i gy(yie), that leaves 
gi(yie) unaffected. By (12) the quality, yie, is increased. However, as yie is the cost 
minimising quality (i.e. satisfies (9)), the change in the RHS of (13) is negligible. Hence 
there is no change in pit/wi, and thus p
i
t and xi(p
i
t/wi). However by noting that 
Xi=xi(pit/wi)/gi(yie), the level of quantity falls. Intuitively, an increase in the substitutability 
of quantity for quality does not influence the total level of satisfaction, but rather causes 
substitution of quality for quantity. 
 From (13) an increase in wi lowers pit/wi. Thus an increase in the wage increases 
the demand for satisfaction. However the quality also increases. Thus the effect of a wage 
increase on the equilibrium quantity is ambiguous. A wage increase raises (lowers) the 
equilibrium number of units when the increased demand for satisfaction (does not) 
outweighs the substitution of quality for quantity. 
From (10) an increase in wi  has two effects on pit. The first is that it increases type 
i customers’ demand and thus pit. The second effect is that it reduces the relative price  
pit/wi. When the elasticity of demand is increasing in p
i
t/wi both these effects act to 
increase pit . However when the elasticity of demand is decreasing in p
i
t/wi both these 
effects act in opposite directions. The following lemma summarises the net effect of an 
increase in wi on pit :  
Lemma 2: Let η ix(pt/w)≡⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞pt
w ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞ε ix′(pt/w)
ε ix(pt/w) . Then the elasticity of the third degree 
discriminating price is given by: 
⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞pit
wi ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞dpit
dwi  = 
η ix(pit/wi)+ aw
iε ix(pit/wi)
pitgi(yie)
η ix(pit/wi)+[aw
i+ψ(yie)]ε ix(pit/wi)
pitgi(yie)
   (14) 
 
The second order conditions require that the denominator of the RHS is positive, so that 
an increase in wi increases pit provided: 
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 η ix(pit/wi)>  - aw
iε ix(pit/wi)
pitgi(yie)
    (15) 
 
The term η ix(pit/wi) represents the rate at which the elasticity of demand is increasing with 
pit/wi. The expression  -η ix(pit/wi)may thus be viewed as representing the extent of 
concavity of the demand curve. Lemma 2 indicates that an increase in wi increases pit 
unless the demand curve is sufficiently concave. In particular if η_(pit/wi)≥0 then an 
increase in wi increases pit. From (14) that the dp
i
t/dwi is associated with a higher value of 
η ix(pit/wi).  
 The efficient level of satisfaction and quality are those that maximise the total 
surplus. They correspond with the satisfaction level and quality of the third degree price 
discriminating firm that faces perfectly elastic demand from all customer types. Hence:  
Proposition 2: The social welfare maximising firm chooses the efficient quality, 
given by (12), and the efficient satisfaction level is given by: 
 
pie  = (awi+ψ(yie))/gi(yie)  ⇔  Pie  = ψ(yie)   (16) 
 
where pie is the efficient price of satisfaction and P
i
e is the efficient price per unit. 
Equation (16) states that the efficient firm provides satisfaction and (equivalently) units 
so that price equals marginal cost. Propositions 1 and 2 collectively imply that Swan 
Invariance holds under third degree price discrimination.  That is, the third degree price 
discriminating firm produces the efficient quality for each variety. 
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3. Self Selection of Varieties 
3.1 Profit Maximisation with Self Selection 
Suppose the firm cannot identify customer types. Type i customers elect to 
purchase variety i if it has a lower price of satisfaction than any other variety, specifically 
if: 
 
(Pi+awi)/gi(yi) ≤ (Pj+awi)/gi(yj) ⇔  pi ≤ pjθji(yj) + a(wi-wj)/gi(yj)  (17) 
 
for j≠i, where θji(y) ≡  gj(y)/gi(y). Note θji′(y) < (>) 0 when j>(<)i. Note that pjθji(yj) is the 
price of satisfaction of variety j from type i customers’ perspective. The term 
a(wi-wj)/gi(yj) measures the time cost to type i customers of purchasing a unit of 
satisfaction from variety j. It is useful to note the following result: 
Lemma 3: The efficient quantity (equivalently satisfaction) and quality satisfies 
the self-selection constraints. 
Note that this result holds under both uniform and non-uniform ordering. 
When customers can self select the firm’s optimisation problem is: 
  
max
pi yi 
 π  s.t. pi ≤ pjθji(yj)+ a(wi-wj)/gi(yj) for i=1,2 and j≠i. (18) 
 
The Lagrangian for this optimisation problem is: 
 
L =   ∑
i=1
2
 [pixi–fi(xi,yi)+∑
j≠i
λij(pjθji(yj)+ a(wi-wj)/gi(yj) -pi)]    (19) 
where λij are the Lagrange multipliers. A self-selection constraint is binding if λij>0 and 
is not binding if λij=0. The first order conditions of (19) yield: 
 
p1(1-(1/ε1x)) = (aw1+ψ(y1))/g1(y1) + w1[λ12-λ21θ12(y1)]/x1′(p1/w1)     (22) 
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p2(1-(1/ε2x)) = (aw2+ψ(y2))/g2(y2) + w2[λ21 - λ12θ21(y2))]/x2′(p2/w2)  (23) 
 
f12(x1,y1) = λ21[θ12′(y1)p1+ a(w1-w2)g2′(y1)/g2(y1)2]     (24) 
 
f22(x2,y2) = λ12[θ21′(y2)p2 - a(w1-w2)g1′(y2)/g1(y2)2]    (25) 
 
and the self-selection constraints are: 
 
p1 ≤ s(p2,y2)         (26) 
and  
p1 ≥  s(p2,y1)         (27) 
 
where s(p2,y) ≡ θ21(y)p2 + a(w1-w2)/g1(y). Note that under uniform ordering s2(p2,y)<0.  
  
3.2 Uniform Ordering 
This sub-section considers the firm’s optimal pricing when customers exhibit 
uniform ordering and can self select varieties.  The following proposition broadly 
describes the impact of self-selection of varieties on price and quality.  
Proposition 3: Under uniform ordering:  
(i) both varieties’ quality cannot be simultaneously distorted,  
(ii) variety 1 can exhibit either undistorted or upwardly distorted quality  
(iii) if variety 1’s quality is distorted, then its equilibrium price of satisfaction, 
p1d, is greater than under third degree price discrimination, i.e. p
1
d> p
1
t(y1e). 
Further the price of satisfaction of variety 2, p2d, is less than under third 
degree price discrimination, i.e. p2d <p
2
t(y2e), 
(iv) variety 2 can exhibit either undistorted or downwardly distorted quality. 
(v) if variety 2 has distorted quality, then p1d< p
1
t(y1e) and p
2
d >p
2
t(y2e).  
According to proposition 3, it is possible that neither of the self-selection constraints is 
binding or, alternatively, that only one of the self-selection constraints is binding.  
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Consider the case when neither self-selection constraint is binding. This requires 
λ12=λ21=0, and thus (22)-(25) are equivalent to (10) and (12). That is, the price and 
quality of each variety is identical to that chosen under third degree price discrimination. 
In particular the firm sets the cost minimising qualities y1e and y2e. Figure 1 can be used to 
illustrate this possibility. Observe that type 1 customers correctly self select if the point 
representing the profit maximising prices of satisfaction lies below the line p1 = s(p2,y2e). 
Type 2 customer correctly self select if the point representing the profit maximising 
prices of satisfaction lies above the line p1 = s(p2,y1e). An example of this possibility is 
price of satisfaction combination represented by the point A in figure 1.  
Quality distortion occurs when third degree price discrimination is not consistent 
with the self-selection constraints. Suppose, for example, the third degree price 
discriminating prices of satisfaction is as represented by point C in figure 1. In this case 
the third degree discriminating price of satisfaction of variety 2 is high relative to that of 
variety 1. If the quality of variety 1 were undistorted (i.e. y1=y1e), the self-selection 
constraint (27) would not hold: type 2 customers would prefer to purchase variety 1. One 
way to satisfy the self-selection constraint would be to sufficiently raise the quality of 
variety 1, while simultaneously adjusting the prices of a unit of varieties 1 and 2 to 
maintain their prices of satisfaction. Graphically this would be represented by a shift 
downward of the line p1=s(p2,y1) in figure 1, until it cut the point C.3 This action raises 
the price of satisfaction of variety 1 to type 2 customers, because type 2 customers are 
less sensitive to quality increases than type 1 customers. A sufficient increase in the 
quality of variety 1 would deter type 2 customers from purchasing variety 1. 
Alternatively the self-selection constraint could be satisfied if the price of satisfaction (or 
equivalently the price of a unit) of variety 1 was raised, or the price of satisfaction of 
variety 2 was lowered. The profit maximising trade off between these three actions 
occurs at point D in figure 1, where the quality of variety 1 is y1d (and the self selection 
constraint is thus represented by the line p1= s(p2,y1d)), the price of satisfaction of variety 
1 is p1t(y
1
d) and the price of variety 2 is p
2
d.   
                                                 
3 Note that s2(p2,yi)<0, so an increase in the quality shifts the curve p1=s(p2,yi) downward. 
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Figure 1 can be used to show why proposition 3(ii) holds: specifically why, when 
the self-selection constraint (27) is binding (λ21>0, λ12=0), the price of satisfaction of 
variety 1 must be less than under third degree price discrimination. Given quality levels 
y1d > y1e and y2e the respective profit maximising prices of satisfaction are p
1
t(y
1
d) and p
2
t(y2e).  
These prices are indicated by the point E in figure 1. Note that these prices do not satisfy 
the self-selection constraint (27). The prices of satisfaction that maximise profit and 
satisfy the self-selection constraints are those for which the isoprofit curve, 
_π(y1d,y2e), is 
tangent to the self-selection constraint. Note that the isoprofit curves are vertical along 
the line p1=p1t(y
1
d) and horizontal along the line p2=p
2
t(y2e).  Thus p
1
d> p
1
t(y1e) and p
2
d <p
2
t(y2e).  
The class of third degree discriminating prices of satisfaction represented by point 
C occurs when the third degree discriminating price of variety 2 is relatively high 
compared to variety 1. In equilibrium the self-selection constraints are “downwardly” 
binding and variety 1 is upwardly distorted. Similarly, the self-selection constraints also 
do not hold for the class of third degree discriminating prices of satisfaction represented 
by point B in figure 1. In this example the third degree discriminating price of satisfaction 
of variety 1 is relatively high compared to variety 2.  The self-selection constraints are 
“upwardly” binding, and variety 2 exhibits downwardly distorted quality.  
Before moving on to analyse the determinants of quality distortion, it is 
worthwhile considering the relationship between distortion under linear pricing (as 
represented by proposition 3) and that predicted by the unit demand model. MR finds 
that, in the unit demand model, customer self-selection is to broaden the spectrum of 
quality levels produced when there is a uniform ordering of the absolute and marginal 
willingness to pay for quality (single crossing property). Proposition 3(i) indicates that 
under uniform ordering the spectrum of quality levels is not narrowed. MR also finds that 
the low quality variety is distorted downward. Proposition 3(iv) indicates that the low 
quality variety (variety 2) does not have upwardly distorted quality. Proposition 3(v) 
indicates that type 1 customers’ gain (relative to third degree price discrimination) in 
those instances when variety 2 is downwardly distorted. This is consistent with the 
findings of MR. However type 2 customers are strictly worse off, which contrasts with 
MR. (In MR’s analysis type 2 customers are always on their participation constraint.)  
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Furthermore in MR’s analysis the price per unit of variety 2 is lower than third degree 
price discrimination. This need not be the case under linear pricing. 
In MR’s analysis the high quality variety does not exhibit quality distortion. MR’s 
analysis (in the case of two customer types) is extended by Donnenfeld and White 
(1988), Donnenfeld and White (1990), Srinagesh and Bradburd (1989) and Srinagesh 
Bradburd and Koo (1992), who modify the utility function adopted by MR. While they 
retain the assumption of unit demand from all customers, they make the willingness to 
pay of customers nonlinearly dependent on quality. By adopting particular functional 
forms for the willingness to pay, these models can generate more general patterns of 
quality distortion than found by MR. In particular Donnenfeld and White (1988) and 
Srinagesh and Bradburd (1989) shows that, in the unit demand model, quality may be 
upwardly distorted in some instances when the absolute and marginal willingness to pay 
for quality are inversely ordered. (In this event the single crossing property does not 
hold.) Proposition 3(ii) also shows that the high quality variety can be upwardly distorted. 
Figure 1 suggests this occurs when the third degree discriminating price of variety 1 is 
sufficiently low.  
The following proposition identifies the relative mark-up as the determinant of 
quality distortion.  
 Proposition 4: If variety j has (un) distorted quality then (i) under third degree 
price discriminating prices and quality μi(ε jx,wi,wj,yie, yje) > (≤) χi(ε ix,ε jx,wi,wj,yie,yje) 
for i≠j, and (ii) in equilibrium μi(ε jx,wi,wj,yid, yjd) > (≤) χi(ε ix,ε jx,wi,wj,yid,yjd) for i≠j, , 
where: 
 
μi(ε jx,wi,wj,yj) ≡ a(w
i-wj)ε jx
gi(yj)(ε jx-1) - 
a(wi-wj)
gi(yj)  = 
a(wi-wj)
gi(yj)(ε jx-1)   (28) 
and: 
χi(ε ix,ε jx,wi,wj,yi,yj) ≡ ⎣⎢
⎡
⎦⎥
⎤(awi+ψ(yj))ε jx
gi(yj)(ε jx-1) - 
(awi+ψ(yi))ε ix
gi(yi)(ε ix-1)    (29) 
 
Broadly speaking, proposition 4 states that variety j exhibits quality distortion if the 
mark-up on variety i is relatively high compared to variety j.  To explain this, it is 
 17 
necessary to provide interpretations of the terms μi and χi. The expression χi consists of 
the difference in two terms, each of which represents a price of satisfaction evaluated 
from the perspective of type i customers. The second term on the RHS of (29) simply 
represents the price of satisfaction of variety i. The first term represents the price of 
satisfaction of variety j (from type i’s perspective) if type j customers had the same 
hourly wage as type i customers. This term thus excludes the mark-up that is due to 
differences in wage levels (as shown by the RHS of (10)). Note that χi is always positive 
when type i and j customers share a common elasticity of demand. This is because the 
quality of variety i is chosen to minimise (average) cost. Further, χi is negative if the 
elasticity of demand of type i customers is sufficiently greater than that of type j 
customers. 
The expression μi captures two effects. The first is the increase in the mark-up on 
the price of satisfaction of variety i relative to variety j (from the perspective of type i 
customers). The second effect is time cost to type i customers from purchasing variety j 
(which is the second term on the RHS of (17)). Note that the first effect dominates in 
determining the sigh of μi. Proposition 4 may be interpreted as saying that variety 1 is 
distorted if its mark-up is relatively large, due either to wage differences (high χ1) or if 
type 1 customers have relatively inelastic demand (low μ1). 
 Proposition 4 thus implies that difference in the elasticity of demand between 
customer types is one source of quality distortion. The following result formalises this. 
Corollary 1: Neither variety exhibits distorted quality if the demand of both 
customer types is sufficiently elastic.  If variety j has distorted quality then (i) 
under third degree price discriminating prices and quality ε jx > Ei(ε ix, yie, yje) for i≠j, 
and (ii) in equilibrium ε jx> Ei(ε ix, yid, yjd) for i≠j, , where: 
Ei(ε ix, yi, yj) = 
⎩⎪
⎨⎪
⎧ ηij
ηij-1 if η
ij<1
∞ otherwise
      (30) 
and where ηij ≡ g
i(yj)[awi+ψ(yi)]ε ix + gi(yi)a(wj-wi)(ε ix-1)
 gi(yi)[awj + ψ(yj)](ε ix-1)   
If the demand of both customer types is sufficiently elastic, then μi is approximately zero. 
Then, as χi is positive, proposition 4 indicates that neither variety exhibits quality 
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distortion. In this event the prices of each variety do not differ greatly from marginal cost. 
Thus marginal cost pricing satisfies self-selection.  
The elasticities of demand in Corollary 1(ii) are evaluated for equilibrium prices 
of satisfaction and quality. This provides a test for the presence of quality distortion, i.e. a 
variety has distorted quality if it is observed to have a demand elasticity greater than Ei. If 
Ei = 1 then, as in equilibrium ε jx > Ei , variety j necessarily has distorted quality. However 
if Ei = ∞ then variety j cannot exhibit quality distortion. 
Corollary 1 shows that the self-selection constraints are not an obstacle to 
achieving efficiency when customers have a common wage. Provided government policy 
ensures the firm produces the efficient number of units and quality for each variety, 
customers will appropriately self select the variety corresponding to their type. 
Furthermore, under Cournot competition an increase in the elasticity of a firm’s residual 
demand curve occurs with an increase in competition. Thus, to the extent that an increase 
in the elasticity of demand can be related to increased competition, corollary 1 suggests 
that quality distortion will not occur in sufficiently competitive markets. Under this 
interpretation, the allocation under perfect competition (with the elasticity of demand for 
both types being perfectly elastic) would correspond with the efficient one identified in 
proposition 2. 
 To understand the implications of proposition 4 it is first useful to consider the 
case in which customers differ in their substitutability of quantity for quality but have a 
common wage. Firstly: 
Corollary 2:  Suppose w1=w2. Variety j does not exhibit distorted quality if 
ε ix(pit/wi) ≥ ε jx(pjt/wj) for i≠j.  
 If customer types have a common elasticity of demand then neither variety exhibits 
quality distortion. In this case there is a common mark-up of varieties 1 and 2 because 
customers have a common wage and elasticity of demand. In this case the third degree 
discriminating prices of satisfaction of varieties 1 and 2 have the same relative values as 
the efficient prices. They therefore satisfy the self-selection constraints.  
To consider the implications of the differing wages of customer types on quality 
distortion it is useful to adopt the following the following assumptions on functional 
form: xi(p/w) = Φi(p/w)φi, gi(y) = Gyθi and ψ(y) = Ψyξ, where Φi, φi, G, θi  Ψ and ξ are 
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positive parameters. Note that ε ix = φi , εψy= ξ and ε i gy= θi. By assumption θ1≥θ2. Under 
this ‘iso-elastic model’: 
Corollary 3: Consider the iso-elastic model with w1/w2>1 and θ1=θ2. (i) For 
sufficiently large w1/w2 neither variety exhibits quality distortion. (ii) Variety 2 
has downwardly distorted quality when φ1≤φ2 provided w1/w2 is sufficiently 
small. (iii) Variety 1 has upwardly distorted quality if φ1 sufficiently greater than 
φ2 and w1/w2 is sufficiently small. (iv) Variety j does not exhibit quality distortion 
as φi→∞. 
An increase in the wage of type 1 consumers relative to type 2 consumers has two effects 
that are relevant to interpreting corollary 3. First the increase in the wage of type 1 
consumers raises the mark-up on variety 1, thus raises μ1. However it also raises the 
quality of variety 1, thus causes the price of satisfaction of variety 1 to fall, which raises 
χ1. In the isoelastic model the latter effect is greater for large w1/w2, while the former 
effect dominates for w1/w2 close to one. Hence there is no quality distortion for large 
w1/w2, while variety 2 is downwardly distorted for w1/w2 close to one.  
When w1/w2 is sufficiently small, μi is approximately zero in the isoelastic model. 
Further more if φ1 is sufficiently larger than φ2 then χ2 is negative. In this case variety 1 
exhibits quality distortion. As the elasticity of demand of type i customers increase, the 
mark-up of variety i under third degree price discrimination is reduced. Thus χi is 
increased. In the isoelastic model this effect is sufficient to ensure that variety j is 
undistorted. 
Proposition 4 indicates that the relative values of the elasticity of demand is an 
important determinant of quality distortion.  The customer types’ elasticities of demands 
can differ in equilibrium because their demand curves (and thus elasticities) differ or 
because the elasticities of demand vary along their demand curve.  To assess the potential 
of the latter effect to cause quality distortion it is natural to consider the case in which all 
customer types have a common demand curve, denoted x
_
(pi/wi). In this case, difference 
across types is solely due to either (i) differences in the substitutability of quantity and 
quality across types or (ii) differences in the hourly wage. In the first of these cases: 
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Corollary 4: Suppose customer types have a common wage, w, and common 
demand function. Then if the elasticity of demand is  
(i) constant neither variety exhibits distorted quality  
(ii) increasing in pit/w then the quality of variety 1 is undistorted and 
the quality of variety 2 is either undistorted or downwardly 
distorted  
(iii) decreasing in pit/w then the quality of variety 2 is undistorted and 
the quality of variety 1 is either undistorted or upwardly distorted 
When customer types have a common constant elasticity of demand the firm sets a 
common mark-up over marginal (average) cost for each variety. As noted in corollary 2, 
with a common mark-up type i customers prefer variety i.  
Observe that the third degree price discriminating price of satisfaction of type 1 
customers is lower than that of type 2 customers. Thus if elasticity is increasing 
(decreasing) in relative price, then type 1 (2) customer’s elasticity of demand is lower 
than that of type 2 (1) customers. There is therefore the potential for the quality of variety 
2 (1) to be downwardly distorted.   
Now consider the case in which customer types differ only in their wages:    
Corollary 5: Suppose customer types have a common substitutability of quantity 
for quality and common demand function. Then: 
(i) if the elasticity of demand is non-decreasing in pit/wi then the quality of 
variety 2 is downwardly distorted for w1/w2 sufficiently close to 1. 
(ii) if the elasticity of demand is decreasing sufficiently in pit/wi so that  
dpit/dwi < 0, and w1/w2 is in the neighbourhood of 1, then the quality of 
variety 1 is upwardly distorted. 
(iii) if demand is perfectly elastic both varieties have undistorted quality. 
Corollary 5 indicates that, for small differences in w1 and w2, variety 2 exhibits 
downward quality distortion for a wide class of demand functions. For instance, a linear 
demand function or any convex demand function would ensure that variety 2 exhibited 
quality distortion. However variety 1 only exhibits quality distortion when customers 
possess a highly concave demand function, one that is unlikely to describe many, if any, 
real markets.  
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 If the elasticity of demand of type 2 customers is relatively elastic, the prices of 
satisfaction under third degree will be given by a point such as B in figure 1. The quality 
of the low quality variety, variety 2, will be downwardly distorted. The equilibrium prices 
of satisfaction would be given by a point such as H in figure 1. In response to an 
inefficiently low quality, a government might be tempted to impose a minimum quality 
requirement on producers. If a minimum quality standard of y2e is imposed, producers 
would face the self-selection constraint p1= s(p2,y2e). In this event the firm would choose 
the profit maximising prices of satisfaction along this curve. These prices are given by 
the point F, where the iso profit curve 
_π(y1e,y2e) is tangent to the self-selection constraint. It 
is possible that the price of satisfaction facing type 2 customers is lower at point H than 
point F. If this is the case, the imposition of minimum standard regulations would have 
lowered the welfare of the consumers of the low quality variety.  
 As noted in corollary 3 if the elasticity of demand is constant there is no quality 
distortion if w1/w2 is sufficiently great. However corollary 5 does not guarantee that 
quality is not distorted if w1/w2 is sufficiently great when the elasticity of demand 
increasing in pit/wi. The following corollary indicates why increasing the difference 
between w1 and w2 may not eliminate quality distortion if the elasticity of demand 
increasing in pit/wi.  
Corollary 6: Consider linear demand, that is x(pi/wi)=A-B(pi/wi) where A,B>0. 
Assume also that y1e→∞ as w1→∞. Then, for sufficiently large w1/w2, neither 
variety (variety 2) is (downwardly) distorted if a/g(y2e)> (<) A/2B. 
An increase in the w1 (holding w2 constant) increases p1t. The elasticity of demand 
increases with A/B. Hence the lower is A/B the higher p1t rises for a unit increase in w1.  
The time cost to type 1 customers from purchasing variety 2 increases by a/g(y2e) for a 
unit increase in w1. When a/g(y2e)>A/2B then time cost dominates the increase in p
1
t if w1 
is sufficiently great, and the third degree discriminating price satisfies the self selection 
constraints. Intuitively, if y2e is too high it is not possible for the increase in w1 to raise y1e 
to sufficiently differentiate the varieties so that self-selection holds at the third degree 
discriminating prices.  
 22 
The above results suggest that a greater the difference in customer types the 
greater is the potential for non-distorted quality. When there are both differences in the 
taste and income of customers, these differences tend to reinforce each other. For 
instance: 
Corollary 7: Suppose, under uniform ordering, customer types differ in both their 
substitutability of quantity for quality and wage. Suppose also that customer types 
have a common constant elasticity of demand. Then neither variety exhibits 
quality distortion if the elasticity of demand is sufficiently great. 
In this case the presence of the heterogeneity in taste differentiates the varieties 
sufficiently to ensure that the third degree discrimination prices satisfy the self-selection 
constraints.   
 An increased difference in either the substitutability of quantity for quality or 
wage between customer types increases the vertical differentiation of the varieties. The 
above analysis indicates that, given sufficiently small differences in the elasticity of 
demand across customer types, this increased differentiation reduces the difference in 
mark-up across varieties and thus reduces the tendency toward quality distortion.  In 
principle proposition 4 (or subsequent corollaries) could predict whether there is 
sufficient differentiation to avoid the use of quality distortion to satisfy self-selection. 
However in practice that approach is almost certainly impractical, given the requirements 
for data to estimate the elasticity of demand, the substitutability of quantity and quality, 
and wages. A more straightforward test of whether a variety’s quality is distorted under 
uniform ordering would be to determine whether the self-selection constraint (26) or (27) 
is binding. Specifically, under uniform ordering, variety 1 would exhibit downwardly 
distorted quality if type 1 customers are virtually indifferent between purchasing variety 1 
and variety 2 and type 2 customers strictly prefer to purchase variety 2.  
 
3.3 Non-uniform Ordering  
Under non-uniform ordering the efficient quality level of variety 1 can either be 
greater or less than that of variety 2: the difference in substitutability of quality for 
quantity causes y1e to be greater than y2e whereas the difference in wages causes y2e to be 
greater than y1e. The in the quality of the varieties depends on which affect dominates. 
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The analysis of the case in which y1e>y2e is qualitatively similar to the analysis of the 
previous section. Thus this section focuses on the case in which the wage differences 
dominates the taste difference and thus it is assumed y2e > y1e. 
Proposition 5: (i) If only variety 1 has distorted quality then p2d < p2t.  If 
additionally variety 1 exhibits upwardly distorted quality then p1d > p1t . (ii) If only 
variety 2 has distorted quality then p1d > p1t. If additionally variety 2 exhibits 
upwardly distorted quality then p2d < p2t.  
Proposition 5(i) is illustrated in figure 2. In figure 2 the self-selection constraints with 
undistorted quality are drawn. Under non-uniform ordering these self-selection 
constraints cross. As variety 1 has the lower quality the line representing the boundary of 
the set (27) is steeper than the line representing the boundary of the set (26). Suppose the 
third degree discriminating prices are represented by the point F. At this point the self-
selection constraint (27) does not hold. (Type 2 consumers would purchase variety 1.)  
When the quality of variety 1 is raised the boundary of (27) rotates clockwise (toward the 
boundary of (26)). First suppose the quality level is raised to y1d. As is the case with 
uniform ordering, the self-selection constraints can also be satisfied by raising the price 
of satisfaction of variety 1 and lowering that of variety 2.  The profit maximising trade 
off between these three actions occurs at point D in figure 2.   
Note that, because a change in quality rotates the boundary of (27), it may be 
optimal for the firm to lower the quality of variety 1. In this case the point E in figure 2 
would lie below that of point F. The price of equilibrium satisfaction of variety 1 may 
therefore be lower than the third degree price discriminating price of satisfaction. 
However equilibrium price of satisfaction of variety 2 remains lower than the third 
degree price of satisfaction.  
There do not appear to be many general conclusions that can be drawn under 
uniform ordering. It is useful to instead consider the behaviours that can be observed 
under non-uniform ordering that do not occur under uniform ordering. The iso-elastic 
model is used to demonstrate these behaviours occur. In the calculations reported below it 
is assumed that Φi=G=Ψ=1 and ξ =1.2.  
As both w2>w1 and y2e >y1e it would appear that points such as A and F in figure 2 
are often representative of the third degree discriminating prices of satisfaction when 
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customer types have a common elasticity of demand. In these cases the self-selection 
constraint (27) does not hold when y1=y1e. In this case the firm distorts quality. However 
it is possible that either y1d<y2d or y1d>y2d. In the latter case there is a reversal of the 
equilibrium ordering of quality from the efficient ordering. The calculations in table 1 
and table 2 show that both possibilities can occur. In table 1, y2d>y1d for w2>1.30, so the 
equilibrium quality ordering of varieties is that of the efficient ordering. This is the case 
depicted in figure 2. In table 2 y2d<y1d for the parameter values for which y2e >y1e, thus a 
reversal of quality ordering has occurred for these parameter values. This case could be 
depicted in figure 2 by assuming the quality of variety 1 makes a greater adjustment (and 
price a lesser adjustment) and the point D would be closer to the point F. In this event the 
self-selection constraint p1=s(p2,y1d) would lie below the constraint p1=s(p2,y2e).  
 Bunching occurs when both customer types purchase one variety. Under uniform 
ordering bunching cannot occur when there are fewer than three customer types. With 
three or more customers a customer type does not warrant a variety of their own if they 
do not generate sufficient demand. (In the case of the unit demand model this occurs 
when a particular type has too few members. See Mussa and Rosen. 1978.) However, as 
is indicated by table 1, bunching can occur with non-uniform ordering with just two 
customer types and when neither type has particularly low demand. In particular, with the 
parameter values assumed in table 1, bunching occurs for w2 = 1.25, and 1.3. In fact 
bunching occurs over the range 1.21≤w2≤1.30. Over this range of w2 variety 1 is 
upwardly distorted and variety 2 is downwardly distorted. Intuitively the firm wants to 
distort the quality of variety 1 upward, and the quality of variety 2 downward in order to 
satisfy self-selection. The firm does not reverse the ordering of the quality of its varieties 
in such a case, as this would represent unnecessary distortion of the quality of one of the 
varieties. Thus it bunches them and produces just one variety.  
The calculations in table 2 and table 1 are conducted for a common elasticity of 
demand. However the analysis of the previous sub-section suggests that differences in 
elasticity of demand can be important in determining whether quality is distorted. Table 3 
reports solutions to the isoleastic model for selected values of φ2 and assuming that φ1=3, 
θ1=0.8, θ2=0.75, w1=1 and w2=1.3. Figure 3 graphs the efficient and equilibrium quality 
levels of the varieties in the iso-elastic model as φ2 varies. Bunching occurs in the range 
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2.0≤φ2≤3.1 for the reasons discussed above. Bunching also occurs for φ2≥14.2. In this 
instance bunching occurs because the profitability of type 2 customers is very low, and it 
is not in the interests of the firm to provide them with a distinct variety. This is the reason 
bunching occurs in the uniform ordering case.  
Over the range 4.1≤φ2≤5.7 the two varieties exhibit the efficient quality level. In 
this case price assumes the burden of satisfying the self-selection constraints. This 
corresponds to cases in which the prices of satisfaction are analogous to point C in figure 
2.  Between 3.2≤φ2≤3.5 both varieties are downwardly distorted, while for 3.6≤φ2≤4 
variety 2 is downwardly distorted and variety 1 is undistorted. Variety 2 is downwardly 
distorted because the third degree discriminating prices of satisfaction can be represented 
by points such as B in figure 2, and the self-selection constraint can be satisfied by 
lowering the quality of variety 2.  
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4. Conclusion 
 
This paper analyses the potential quality distortion that accompanies vertical 
differentiation.  A model is developed in which (in contrast to the existing literature) 
customers purchase multiple units of the good at a linear price. Vertical differentiation 
occurs when there is more than one customer type, i.e. groups of customers whose hourly 
wage rate and/or substitutability of quantity and quality is common within the group but 
differs across groups. These differences cause customer types to demand different 
combinations of quality and quantity. However these two sources of vertical 
differentiation are expressed differently in consumer demand. A higher substitutability of 
quantity and quality tends to cause customers to demand quality at the expense of 
quantity. A high wage increases the opportunity cost of time and, because each unit 
requires time to consumer, increase the demand for quality. (The consequent substitution 
of quality for quantity is ameliorated by the increased demand for satisfaction 
accompanying a higher wage.) The higher wage also has the effect of reducing the 
elasticity of demand perceived by the firm, thus is accompanied by an incentive for the 
firm to raise price.  
The firm responds to the differing demands for quality by customer types by 
producing a number of varieties, each of which is designed to appeal to a particular 
customer type. This vertical differentiation alone, however, is not sufficient evidence that 
there is quality distortion. For instance, if demand is sufficiently elastic no variety 
exhibits quality distortion. In this case type i customers perceive the price of satisfaction 
of variety i as the lowest price of satisfaction and hence purchases that variety. The 
higher quality of variety 1 offsets its higher price per unit for type 1 customers, but not 
for type 2 customers. An implication of this result is that the self-selection constraints are 
satisfied in the efficient allocation. Quality distortion, therefore, only occurs when the 
exercise of market power by the monopolist alters the relative balance of each variety’s 
prices of satisfaction (from that given by efficient levels) in such a way that the self-
selection constraints no longer hold.  
Under uniform ordering the relative mark-up of varieties is a determinant of 
quality distortion. Differences in the mark-up of varieties are due to the differences in the 
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elasticity of demand across customer types or differences in the wage across customer 
types. Much of the detail in the analysis developed in this paper is required to account for 
the way in which the elasticity of demand may differ across customer types: Differences 
in the elasticity of demand between customer types could occur either because the 
demand function differs across types or the elasticity of demand varies along customers’ 
demand curve. However to summarise the findings of the analysis it is useful to consider 
the case in which two customers types have a common demand curve. Further to rule out 
variations in the mark-up because of variations in the elasticity of demand along the 
demand curve it is useful to consider the case in which customers types have a common 
constant elasticity of demand. If customer types differ only in the substitutability of 
quantity for quality then no variety exhibits quality distortion as there is a common mark-
up on each variety.   
Suppose, instead, that customer types have different wages and a common 
substitutability of quantity and quality. The relatively higher wage of type 1 has two 
effects. As noted above, it causes type 1 customers to have a higher demand for quality 
relative to quantity. It also provides an incentive for the firm to set a relatively higher 
mark-up to type 1 customers than type 2 customers (by increasing the elasticity of 
demand of the demand curve the firm faces). Consequently wage differences may cause 
an upwardly violation of the self-selection constraints and thus downward quality 
distortion of variety 2. When customer types have a common constant elasticity of 
demand this effect dominates over the separation of types due to quality differences for 
small differences in the wages of customer types. However when the wage difference is 
sufficiently large this effect is relatively small and neither variety exhibits quality 
distortion.  
In summary, a striking conclusion from the above analysis is that markets in 
which consumer are characterised by uniform ordering do not exhibit quality distortion 
when the firm (using linear prices) sets a common mark-up across varieties. Thus, in 
contrast to the conclusions of MR, quality distortion need not be – and is unlikely to be – 
ubiquitous. Indeed a straightforward empirical test for whether any variety exhibits 
quality distortion is to determine whether the self-selection constraints (26) and (27) are 
binding. If neither is binding, none of the varieties has distorted quality. 
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In such empirical investigations, is also necessary to identify whether uniform 
ordering holds. If it does, the above straightforward conclusions regarding quality 
distortion can be drawn. If it does not, a wide range of quality distortion patterns are 
possible. For instance table 3 indicates that it is possible that (in contrast to the uniform 
ordering case) both self-selection constraints can simultaneously hold. In this event it is 
possible that either one or both varieties have downward distorted quality. Indeed it is 
possible that one self-selection constraint holds and the quality of both varieties is 
undistorted. Furthermore, bunching may occur, in which case there is a sub-optimal 
number of varieties. In this case both customer types purchase a variety that has, for 
them, an inefficient quality level. Thus, under non-uniform ordering, it is not 
straightforward to draw conclusions regarding the distortion of the quality of varieties.   
The literature on quality choice is closely related to that on durability choice. In 
his survey, Waldman (2003) quotes the results of MR as a source of distortion of 
durability away from its efficient level (specifically low durability goods have 
inefficiently low durability). However the analysis in this paper indicates that the 
presence of product varieties with different durability levels need not imply inefficient 
durability levels. Consider the classic example of light globes. All consumers presumably 
have a common substitutability of quantity for durability (as all consumers are interested 
in is the total quantity of light). However high wage consumers would prefer high 
durability light globes. From the analysis of this paper it can be concluded that the 
durability of a variety of light globe is only inefficient if there is a material difference in 
mark-ups between the various varieties with different durability levels. As noted above, 
this need not be the case. 
The analysis of this paper is concerned only with the question of whether vertical 
product differentiation causes quality distortion. However there are other sources of 
quality distortion that could be present in real world markets that are not considered by 
the analysis in this paper. In this paper product quality is assumed common knowledge. 
Of course, it is well known that asymmetric information about quality can lead to 
inefficiently low quality (Akerlof, 1970). Second, if the cost function does not exhibit 
constant returns to scale, Swan invariance does not hold. In this case a monopolist’s 
actions in restricting output of each variety to drive up price will cause the cost 
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minimising quality level to change. Similarly if there are economies of scope in the 
production of varieties, a distortion in the quality level of one variety may distort the 
quality level of another variety (Kim and Kim, 1996). Finally, there may be a fixed cost 
to producing varieties. In this case there may be insufficient customers of a given type to 
produce a separate variety for them. Customers of different types (characteristics) might 
purchase a single variety. This type of bunching leads to quality distortion when the 
elasticity of demand of customer types differ (Sibly, 2007). 
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Table 1: Isoelastic model with φ1=φ1=3, θ1=0.8, θ2=0.75, w1=1 
w2 1.1 1.2 1.25 1.3 1.31 1.35 1.4 
p1t  2.835 2.835 2.835 2.835 2.835 2.835 2.835 
p2t  3.012 3.112 3.16 3.207 3.216 3.253 3.298 
p1d  2.85 2.871 2.881 2.892 2.887 2.901 2.911 
p2d  2.999 3.085 3.129 3.172 3.173 3.213 3.256 
p1c  2.871 2.898 2.912 2.926 2.929 2.941 2.956 
p2c  2.983 3.048 3.08 3.112 3.119 3.145 3.177 
y1e  1.782 1.782 1.782 1.782 1.782 1.782 1.782 
y2e  1.657 1.782 1.843 1.905 1.917 1.966 2.026 
y1d  1.785 1.785 1.822 1.863 1.739 1.779 1.775 
y2d  1.657 1.782 1.822 1.863 1.895 1.966 2.026 
λ12 0 0 0.019 0.14 0.122 0 0 
λ21 0.0005 0.001 0.02 0.137 0.12 0.002 0.002 
P1 3.531 3.565 3.657 3.758 3.494 3.6 3.607 
P2 3.28 3.558 3.657 3.758 3.813 3.984 4.129 
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Table 2: Isoelastic model with φ1=φ1=3, 
θ1=0.8, θ2=0.4, w1=1 
w2 3.5 4 4.5 5 
p1t  2.835 2.835 2.835 2.835 
p2t  6.535 7.143 7.727 8.289 
p1d  3.265 3.388 3.506 3.62 
p2d  6.442 7.048 7.633 8.199 
p1c  3.701 3.78 3.858 3.936 
p2c  5.556 5.953 6.35 6.746 
y1e  1.782 1.782 1.782 1.782 
y2e  1.594 1.782 1.966 2.146 
y1d  2.498 2.681 2.851 3.008 
y2d  1.594 1.782 1.966 2.146 
λ12 0 0 0 0 
λ21 0.0046 0.0049 0.005 0.005 
P1 5.79 6.457 7.107 7.736 
P2 4.263 4.88 5.502 6.127 
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Table 3: Isoelastic model with φ1=3, θ1=0.8, θ2=0.75, w1=1, w2=1.3 
φ2 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 5 6 9 12 15 20 
p1t  2.835 2.835 2.835 2.835 2.835 2.835 2.835 2.835 2.835 2.835 2.835 2.835 
p2t  6.415 4.276 3.564 3.207 2.993 2.851 2.673 2.566 2.405 2.333 2.291 2.251 
p1d  5.402 3.648 3.127 2.892 2.768 2.705 2.672 2.703 2.811 2.832 2.835 2.835 
p2d  5.791 3.952 3.414 3.172 3.044 2.979 2.944 2.976 3.088 3.11 3.112 3.112 
p1c  6.032 3.962 3.271 2.926 2.719 2.581 2.409 2.305 2.15 2.079 2.039 2 
p2c  3.112 3.112 3.112 3.112 3.112 3.112 3.112 3.112 3.112 3.112 3.112 3.112 
y1e  1.782 1.782 1.782 1.782 1.782 1.782 1.782 1.782 1.782 1.782 1.782 1.782 
y2e  1.905 1.905 1.905 1.905 1.905 1.905 1.905 1.905 1.905 1.905 1.905 1.905 
y1d  2.29 1.897 1.878 1.863 1.775 1.782 1.782 1.782 1.781 1.782 1.782 1.782 
y2d  1.905 1.897 1.878 1.863 1.899 1.904 1.905 1.903 1.822 1.786 1.782 1.782 
λ12 0 0.007 0.044 0.14 0.031 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.01 0.01 0.0096 0.0096
λ21 0.006 0.016 0.049 0.137 0.028 0 0 0 0.0095 0.0098 0.0094 0.0093
P1 9.481 5.087 4.177 3.758 3.381 3.295 3.241 3.291 3.46 3.496 3.5 3.5 
P2 8.089 5.087 4.177 3.758 3.623 3.529 3.475 3.523 3.541 3.504 3.5 3.5 
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Mathematical Appendix : Proofs 
 
Proof of lemma 1: From (11): 
fi2(x,y) =  [x/ygi(y)][εψy(y)ψ(y)  -  (awi +ψ(y))ε i gy(y)] 
     < [gι(y)/gi(y)][x/ygι(y)][εψy(y)ψ(y)  -  (awι+ψ(y))ε ι gy(y)  + a(wι-wi)ε ι gy(y)]  
     = [gι(y)/gi(y)]fι2(x,y) + a(wι-wi)xε ι gy(y)/ygi(y) 
Hence fι2(x,y1e) >0 when fi2(x,yιe) =0. Given f i 22>0, this implies yie>yιe.    || 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: Integrating consumer i’s demand curve, (5), yields their consumer 
surplus, vij(pi), where vij(pi)= ⌡⌠
Pi
∞
Xij(r,y)dr = ⌡⌠
pi
∞
xij(r)dr. Consumer i’s benefit can be 
expressed as: 
 Bij(Pi) = ⌡⌠
Pi
∞
Xij(r,y)dr + PiXij 
= bij(pi) – awiXij   
 
where bij(pi) = vij(pi) + pi.xij(pi). Let bi(pi) = ∑
j=1
mi
bij(pi). Note that bi′(pi) = pixi′(pi). Write:  
fi(xi(pi),yi) =∑
j=1
mi
[awiXij +Xijψ(yi)] = xi(pi)[awi +ψ(yi)]/gi(yi) 
 
The surplus may thus be expressed as: 
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S = ∑
i=i
n
∑
i=i
mi
( )Bij(Pi)-Xijψ(yi)  = ∑
i=i
n
( )bi(pi)-fi(xi(pi),yi)  
Now, the first order condition for price of satisfaction to maximise the surplus is:  
 
∂S/∂pi = bi′(pi)-fi1(xi(pi),yi) = pixi′(pi) - xi′(pi)[awi +ψ(yi)]/gi(yi) = 0 
 
This yields (16). The first order condition for quality to maximise the surplus is: 
  
∂S/∂yi =-fi2(xi(pi),yi) = 0 
 
which yields (12).        || 
 
Proof of proposition 3: (i) Note that (24) shows that there is no distortion of quality for 
variety 1, i.e. y1=y1e, if λ21=0. In this event the self-selection constraint (26) is not binding. 
Similarly there is no distortion in the quality of variety 2 if λ12=0. It is not possible for 
both varieties to have distorted quality. For this to be the case both self-selection 
constraints must be binding. In this event, it is necessary that y1=y2. However, if the 
constraint (27) is binding, λ21>0, and hence (24) implies that y1>y1e. Similarly (25) 
implies that y2<y2e. As y2e<y1e, this implies that y1>y2. Hence both self-selection constraints 
cannot both hold simultaneously. 
(ii) Note θ12′(y1)p1+ a(w1-w2)g2′(y1)/g2(y1)2 >0. Hence by (24) f12(x1,y1)>0 if λ21>0, hence  
y1>y1e . 
(iii) By (24), variety 1’s quality is (upwardly) distorted when λ21>0. Let the equilibrium 
value of y1 be y1d > y1e. In this case the constraint (27) is binding and the constraint (26) is 
not. Thus λ12=0. The first order condition (25) becomes: 
 
f22(x2,y2) = 0         
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In equilibrium there is no distortion of the quality of variety 2, i.e. y2 = y2e. From (23) 
when λ21>0 and λ12=0 the equilibrium price, p2d, is given by: 
 
[p2d(1-(1/ε2x)) – (aw2+ψ(y2e))/g2(y2e)]x2′(p2d) = λ21 > 0    (A1) 
 
Note that (A1) is equivalent to π21(p2d,y2e)>0. On the assumption that the profit function is 
concave, this implies that p2d < p
2
t(y2e)≡p2t. Further, by (22) the equilibrium price of variety 
1 ,p1d, is given by: 
 
[p1d(1-(1/ε1x)) – (aw1+ψ(y1d))/g1(y1d)]x1′(p1d)  = - λ21θ12(y1d)     (A2) 
 
Equation (A2) is equivalent to π11(p1,y1d)<0, which implies that p1d > p1t(y1d) Marginal cost is 
greater when quality is y1d rather than y1e, hence p
1
t(y
1
d)> p
1
t(y1e), and thus p
1
d > p
1
t(y1e). 
 
(iv) Note θ21′(y2)p2 - a(w1-w2)g1′(y2)/g1(y2)2 <0, hence f22(x2,y2)<0 if  λ12>0. Hence the 
quality of variety 2 is downwardly distorted. 
 
(v) This proof proceeds as does part (ii).    || 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: (i) From (17) there is upward (no) distortion of variety j’s quality 
if: 
 
(Pit+awi)/gi(y
i
e) > (≤ )(Pjt+awi)/gi(yje) 
Equivalently: 
 
(awi+ψ(yie))ε ix
gi(yie)(ε ix-1)   > (≤) 
(awj+ψ(yje))ε jx
gi(yje)(ε jx-1)  + 
a(wi-wj)
gi(yje)  
or: 
(awi+ψ(yie))ε ix
gi(yie)(ε ix-1)  - 
(awi+ψ(yje))ε jx
gi(yje)(ε jx-1)  > (≤) 
a(wj-wi)ε jx
gi(yje)(ε jx-1) + 
a(wi-wj)
gi(yje)  
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or: 
μi(ε ix,ε jx,wi,wj,yie, yje) > (≤) χi(wi,wj,yie,yje)  
 
(ii) The proof then proceeds as part (i). || 
 
 
Proof of Corollary 1: (i) From (17) there is upward distortion of variety j’s quality if  
 
pit  > pjtjθji(yje) + a(wi-wj)/gi(yje) 
 
Substituting (10) into this inequality yields: 
 
Di
ε ix
ε ix-1 > D
j ε jx
ε jx-1 + B
ij 
 
where: 
Di≡(aw
i+ψ(yie))
gi(yie)  
 
Dj≡(aw
j+ψ(yje))
gi(yje)  
and  
 
Bij≡a(w
i-wj)
gi(yje)  
 
Rearranging yields: 
 
[Diε ix - Bij(ε ix-1) - Dj(ε ix-1)] ε jx > Di ε ix - Bij(ε ix-1) 
or: 
ε jx > η
ij
ηij -1 
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where ηij ≡ D
iε ix - Bij(ε ix-1)
Dj(ε ix-1)  = 
gi(yj)[awi+ψ(yi)]ε ix + gi(yi)a(wj-wi)(ε ix-1)
gi(yi)[awj + ψ(yj)](ε ix-1)  
 
provided: 
Diε ix - Bij(ε ix-1) - Dj(ε ix-1) > 0 
 or: 
Diε ix - Bij(ε ix-1) > Dj(ε ix-1)  
or: 
  ηij > 1. 
 
     
(ii) If variety j is distorted in equilibrium then (20) yields: 
 
pi(1-(1/ε ix))  = (awi+ψ(yi))/gi(yi) + λij/xi′(pi) 
and  
pj(1-(1/ε jx)) = (awj+ψ(yj))/gj(yj) - λijθji(yj) /xj′(pj) 
 
Hence: 
pi(1-(1/ε ix))  < (awi+ψ(yi))/gi(yi)  
and  
pj(1-(1/ε jx)) > (awj+ψ(yj))/gj(yj)  
 
Further in equilibrium the self-selection constraint holds: 
 
pi = pjθji(yj) + a(wi-wj)/gi(yj) 
Hence: 
awi+ψ(yi)
gi(yi)(1-(1/ε ix)) > 
(awj+ψ(yj))
gi(yj)(1-(1/ε jx))  + 
a(wi-wj)
gi(yj)   
 
The proof then proceeds as part (i).    || 
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Proof of corollary 2: The third degree discriminating price and quality satisfy the self-
selection constraint (17) if: 
 
aw+ψ(yie)
gi(yie)(1-(1/ε ix)) < 
aw+ψ(yje)
gi(yje)(1-(1/ε jx))      (A3) 
 
In this case λij=0, and there is no distortion in the quality of variety j. Note that: 
 
aw+ψ(yie)
gi(yie)  < 
aw+ψ(yje)
gi(yje)    
 
 because yie  is the cost minimising quality for variety i. Hence (A3) holds when ε ix(pit/wi) 
≥ ε jx(pjt/wj) for i≠j. || 
 
 
Proof of corollary 3: 
(i)Assume θi=θj=θ. Then: 
 
ηij = ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞φi
φi-1 ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞wi
wj
ξ-θ
 ξ  + ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞ξ-θ
ξ ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞1-⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞wi
wj  
 
It is readily confirmed from (30) that E1 = ∞ for all (w1/w2)>ω1, where ω1>0 satisfies: 
 
⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞φ1
φ1-1 ( )ω
1
ξ-θ
 ξ  + ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞ξ-θ
ξ ( )1-( )ω
1  = 1 
 
Similarly E2 = ∞ for all (w1/w2)>ω2, where ω2>0 satisfies: 
 
⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞φ2
φ2-1 ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞1
ω2
ξ-θ
 ξ  + ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞ξ-θ
ξ ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞1-⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞1
ω2  = 1 
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(ii) Write w1/w2 = 1 + δw. For sufficiently small δw: 
 
η12 ≈  ξφ
1+(ξ-θ)δw
ξ(φ1-1)  
 
and hence: 
 
E1 ≈ φ1 - (ξ-θ)(φ
1-1)δw
ξ + (ξ-θ)δw  < φ
1.  
 
Thus if φ1≤φ2 then E1 < φ2 and thus variety 2 exhibits quality distortion. 
 
(iii)  Write w2/w1 = 1 - δw. For sufficiently small δw: 
 
η21 ≈  ξφ
2-(ξ-θ)δw
ξ(φ2-1)  
 
and hence: 
 
E2 ≈ φ2 + (ξ-θ)(φ
2-1)δw
ξ + (ξ-θ)δw  .  
 
Variety 1 has distorted quality if  E2 < φ1 or if φ1-φ2 > (ξ-θ)(φ
2-1)δw
ξ + (ξ-θ)δw  . 
 
(iv) If φi→∞ then ωi→1. Hence variety i does not exhibit distorted quality for any 
w1/w2>1.         || 
 
 
Proof of corollary 4: Let:  
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Γji= pi - pjθji(yje) = (aw+ψ(y
i
e))
gi(yie)(1-(1/ε ix)) - 
(aw+ψ(yje))
gi(yje)(1-(1/ε jx)) for i≠j 
 
where ε ix = ε_(pit/w). From the self selection constraints, (17), variety j exhibits distorted 
quality if Γji>0. 
(i) If ε_(pit/w) is constant then  
 
Γji=  (1-(1/ε_))-1⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞(aw+ψ(yie))
gi(yie)  - 
(aw+ψ(yje))
gi(yje)   < 0 
 
as yie is the cost minimising quality for type i customers. 
(ii) Note that p1t< p
2
t. If ε_(pit/w) is increasing then ε1x < ε2x. In this case Γ12<0 and 
variety 1 has undistorted quality. However if ε1x is sufficiently close to 1 
(relative to ε2x) then Γ21>0 and variety 1 exhibits downwardly distorted quality. 
(iii) If ε_(pit/w) is decreasing then ε1x > ε2x. In this case Γ21<0 and variety 2 has 
undistorted quality. However if ε1x is sufficiently close to 1 (relative to ε2x) then 
Γ21>0 and variety 1 exhibits upwardly distorted quality. 
 
Proof of corollary 5: 
(i) Let Γji= pit - pjt – a(wi-wj)/g(yje). The quality of variety j is distorted if  Γji>0. Note that 
if w1=w2 then  Γji=0. Now: 
 
∂Γ21/∂w1= dp1t/dw1 – a/g(y2e) 
 
When this expression is evaluated for w1=w2 then: 
∂Γ21/∂w1 =  a
g(ye)(1-(1/ε_))
 + 
(aw+ψ(ye))
g(ye)(1-(1/ε_))2
 
ε_′
ε_2
  – 
a
g(ye) 
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where ε_ is the elasticity of demand evaluated at the common price of satisfaction and ye 
is the common quality. If ε_′>0 this expression is positive. 
 
(ii) As above: 
 
∂Γ12/∂w2= dp2t/dw2 – a/g(y1e) 
 
If dp2t/dw2 < 0 in the neighbourhood of w1=w2, then Γ12>0 for w1/w2 sufficiently close to 
1. In this case variety 1 exhibits upwardly distorted quality. 
 
(iii) If the demand of both customer types is perfectly elastic: 
 
 Γji= pit - pjt – a(wi-wj)/g(yje).  
 
= 
awi+ψ(yie)
g(yie)  - 
awi+ψ(yje)
g(yje) . 
 
In this case Γji<0 because  yie is the cost minimising quality for type i customers.  || 
 
Proof of Corollary 6: If demand is given by x(pi/wi)=A-B(pi/wi) where A,B>0 
Then  
pit  = Awi/(2B) + (awi+ψ(yie))/(2gi(yie))  
 
Hence: 
Γ21= p1t - p2t – a(w1-w2)/g(y2e).  
= Aw1/(2B) + (aw1+ψ(y1e))/(2g1(y1e)) – Aw2/(2B) + (aw2+ψ(y2e))/(2g2(y2e)) – a(w1-w2)/g(y2e) 
= (w1-w2)[A/(2B)-a/g(y2e)] + (aw1+ψ(y1e))/(2g1(y1e)) – (aw1+ψ(y2e))/(2g2(y2e))  
 
The quality of variety 2 is distorted if Γ21>0. Note that if w1=w2 then Γ21=0. Now: 
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∂Γ21/∂w1= (1/2)[A/B+a/g1(y1e)] – a/g(y2e) 
Further: 
∂(Γ21)2
∂2w1   =  
-ag1′(y1e)
2g1(y1e)2  
∂y1e
∂w1< 0.  
 
Assuming that y1e→∞ as w1→∞ then, for sufficiently large w1 
 
∂Γ21/∂w1  ≈ (1/2)[A/B] – a/g(y2e) 
 
If  (1/2)[A/B] – a/g(y2e) > 0 then ∂Γ21/∂w1>0 for all w1≥w2. Hence the quality of variety 2 
is always downwardly distorted. If (1/2)[A/B] – a/g(y2e) < 0, then ∂Γ21/∂w1 =0 for some 
value of w1, say w1*. Then  ∂Γ21/∂w1<0 for all w1>w1*. However as ∂(Γ21)2/∂2w1< 0 there 
must be some w1, say w1**>w1*, for which  Γ21=0. Thus Γ21<0 for all w1>w1**. In this 
case neither variety exhibits quality distortion for all w1>w1**. 
 
Proof of Corollary 7: 
 
With both a heterogeneity in taste and wages: 
 
   Γji= pit - θji(yje)pjt – a(wi-wj)/gi(yje). 
 
With constant elasticity of demand: 
 
∂Γ21/∂w1 =  ag1(y1e)(1-(1/φ))  – 
a
g1(y2e) 
 
Further: 
∂(Γ21)2
∂2w1  =  
-ag1′(y1e)
(1-(1/φ))g1(y1e)2 
∂y1e
∂w1< 0 
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Let y1e(w2) be the cost minimising quality when w1=w2. Observe that if:   
φ > 11-[g1(y2e)/g1(y1e(w2))] 
 
then ∂Γ21/∂w1 < 0 when w1=w2. As ∂(Γ21)2/∂2w1<0 this implies that ∂Γ21/∂w1 < 0 for all 
w1>w2. Hence Γ21<0 for all w1≥w2 and variety 2 does not exhibit distorted quality. || 
 
Proof of Proposition 5: 
 
(i) By assumption only variety 1 is distorted. By (24), variety 1’s quality is distorted 
when λ21>0 and by (25) variety 2’s quality is not distorted when λ12=0. Thus y2e is the 
equilibrium quality of variety 2. Let y1d be the equilibrium quality of variety 1. From (23) 
when λ21>0 and  λ12=0: 
 
[p2d(1-(1/ε2x)) – (aw2+ψ(y2e))/g2(y2e)]x2′(p2d) = λ21 > 0     
 
Note that this equation is equivalent to π21(p2d,y2e)>0. On the assumption that the profit 
function is concave, this implies that the profit maximising price, p2d, satisfies p
2
d < p
2
t. 
Further, (22) becomes: 
 
[p1d(1-(1/ε1x)) – (aw1+ψ(y1d))/g1(y1d)]x1′(p1d)  = - λ21θ12(y1d)      
 
This equation is equivalent to π11(p1,y1d)<0, which implies that p1d > p1t(y1d). If y1d>y1e then p1d 
> p1t(y
1
d)> p
1
t. 
 
(ii) This proof proceeds as does part (i)   
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